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Portacom New Zealand Ltd v Port A Room Ltd 
(High Court, Auckland CIV 2007-404-2536, 6 
December 2007, Keane J) 
This was a trade mark case in which the plaintiff, Portacom 
New Zealand Ltd, sought an interim injunction and orders 
requiring that the defendants remove "Port A Room" from 
all marketing materials and that any such branded materials 
be delivered up. 
Portacom was New Zealand's leading supplier of portable 
buildings for sale and hire with some 65 per cent of the 
national market. It had used the brand name "Portacom" in 
New Zealand for 25 years, and it had four registered "Portacom" 
trademarks. It also traded under the by-line "The Flexible 
Building Solution Specialists". 
The defendant company, Port A Room Ltd, was incorpo-
rated in November 2006 but had still to trade. The second 
defendant, Joseph Partridge, launched the product "Port A 
Room" in 2005 and had averaged one sale per month since 
then. The "Port A Room" product name was associated with 
the byline "Portable Building Solutions". 
In November 2006 Portacom's managing director learned 
about the defendants business from Trade Me. He concluded 
that it was targeting Portacom's market by adopting a brand 
and byline deceptively or confusingly similar to its own, and 
claiming that its product was "also known as ... Portacom 
Port a corn ... Portacomm." Portacom wrote a cease and 
desist letter to the defendants, alleging breach of the Trade 
Marks Act 2002, breach of the Fair Trading Act 1986, and 
passing off. The defendants replied, denying any infringe-
ment and arguing that "Port A Room" was merely descrip-
tive of rooms that are portable, and that the prefix "Port A" 
was commonplace and used by many brands across a range 
of products. 
On 7 May 2007, Portacom brought this trade mark action 
for an interim injunction, arguing that "Port A Room" was a 
deceptive and misleading brand that eroded the distinctive-
ness of its own mark, "Portacom", and caused damage to its 
reputation and loss of sales. The defendants opposed the 
orders sought as unjustifiable and oppressive, arguing that 
their brand and the plaintiff's mark were quite distinct, as 
were the respective markets. This was supported by the fact 
that Portacom did not discover their product until 15 months 
after its launch and had not been able to point to any instance 
of confusion. They indicated an intention to counterclaim 
seeking an order revoking the plaintiff's "Portacom" 
trademarks on grounds they had become merely descriptive 
and generic and were used in the market to describe any 
building that was portable, regardless of manufacturer, 
vendor or hirer. 
The Judge set out the principles for interim relief.1 The 
Judge noted that the interim relief sought was in part man-
datory, requiring a fair level of assurance that any such grant 
of interim relief would be vindicated at trial? The Judge went 
on to consider the strength of the plaintiff's case in trade 
mark infringement. 
The plaintiff argued trade mark infringement in terms of s 
89(1)(c) of the Trade Marks Act 2002, relating to the use of a 
similar mark in relation to similar goods and services. The 
Judge first compared the two marks. The plaintiff argued 
that "Port A Room" was so similar to "Portacom" as to be 
likely to deceive or confuse. Each had three syllables, the first 
two of which "port" and "a", were dominant, and the third 
"corn" and "room" shared a similar vowel sound and the 
same last consonant. Even though not visually identical, they 
sounded similar, which was significant as many orders were 
placed by phone by people unfamiliar with the brand. The 
plaintiff also contended that "Portacom" and "Port A Room" 
both dominated their logo and each had an associated byline 
sharing the words "building solutions". 
The defendants argued that while "Portacom" ran the 
three syllables together, particularly the first and second, 
"Port A Room" gave each a distinct value, and the third had a 
different vowel sound. They also disputed the byline point. 
The Judge held that the comparison favoured the plaintiff to 
the extent that it raised a serious question to be tried. The 
Judge also noted that the Assistant Commissioner had recently 
concluded that "Porta Cube" was so similar to "Portacom" 
as to be liable to confuse, if not deceive, and that that had to 
be persuasive, although there were differences from the present 
case. 
The Judge went on to consider whether the dominant 
element in the two marks, "Porta" or "Port A", had become 
descriptive or generic, identifying only the feature of port-
ability. The Judge observed that the trade mark register and 
telephone directories showed that it had wide appeal. There 
was also evidence that the plaintiffs had produced a brochure 
in which they stated that the name "Portacom" was often 
used to describe any modular, transportable building, and 
also evidence of marketing strategies attempting to counter 
generic use. 
1. Referring to Klissers Farmhouse Bakeries Ltd v Harvest Bakeries Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 129 (CA) at 142. 
2. Locabail International Finance Limited v Agroexport [1986] 1 All ER 901; [19961 1 WLR 657. 
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In relation to the markets in which the two marks were 
used, the Judge said that the products were in essence indis-
tinguishable and were competing in the same market. How-
ever this was not enough to show that it was objectively 
likely that a significant proportion of consumers in that 
market could be deceived or confused. The Judge said that, 
while the plaintiff had 65 per cent of the national hire 
market, the defendants scarcely had a toe in the market. The 
plaintiff's fear was not the effect of deception or confusion 
now but the possibility of one or the other should "Port A 
Room" products begin to appear in greater numbers, so that 
its fear was more hypothetical than real. 
The Judge concluded that the plaintiff did have an argu-
able case but it was certainly open to the defendants to argue 
that, whether or not "Port A Room" was so similar to 
"Portacom" as to be deceptive or confusing, "Portacom" 
had ceased to be distinctive and had become generic. As 
things stood, it was unlikely that a significant number of 
consumers in the market could, objectively speaking, be 
deceived or confused by the "Port A Room" mark. The 
markets in which the two marks figured were still too far 
apart. 
The Judge then considered the balance of convenience and 
overall justice, finding that neither favoured the plaintiff. 
The "Port A Room" product had been on the market for two 
and a half years and a grant of interim relief after the passing 
of such a length of time would be incongruous and could 
have the effect of nullifying a two and a half year investment 
in a nascent business and prevent the merits being gone into 
when clearly they should be. The plaintiff was also far better 
placed than the defendants to answer any claim in damages. 
The plaintiff's application for interim injunctive relief, 
and related orders, was therefore declined and the case was 
to be set down for hearing as soon as practicable. 
Comment 
This decision on interim relief appears uncontroversial in 
outcome, and of course reaches no final decision on infringe-
ment. However the judgment raises some potential issues. 
The first is in relation to the discussion of whether the mark 
is generic. The Judge appears to equate descriptive and 
generic trade marks, and suggests that descriptiveness neces-
sarily means that a mark is generic, which is not necessarily 
always the case. It is also not entirely clear whether the Judge 
in considering whether the mark had become generic was 
considering only whether the dominant element "Port A" 
was generic, or whether the mark as a whole was generic. 
The second issue is about the relationship between market 
share and likely deception or confusion. The Judge almost 
seems to suggest that the fact that the defendants have a very 
small market share means that the two products are not in 
the same market and that there is therefore no likelihood of 
deception or confusion. The Judge says that the products are 
"in essence indistinguishable" and that the defendants have 
entered the plaintiff's market. However, the Judge also says 
that the markets in which the two marks figure are "still too 
far apart". It seems likely that the Judge did not intend to 
suggest that the two products are not in the same market 
merely because of a large difference in market share. On its 
own, a small market share does not in itself mean that use of 
a mark cannot deceive or confuse. 
 
Ministry of Health v HealthTPio Inc (High Court, 
Wellington CIV 2007.485-1272, 30 January 2008, 
Clifford J) 
This was an unsuccessful appeal by the Ministry of Health 
and the Accident Compensation Corporation against a deci-
sion of the Assistant Commissioner of Patents allowing vari-
ous amendments to the complete specification of the respondent, 
HealthTrio's, patent application. The patent application related 
to a computer system designed to facilitate the use and 
exchange of health data between originators and users of 
that data. 
Background 
HealthTrio filed a complete specification on 24 February 
2005, and acceptance was published on 24 June 2005. Four 
notices of opposition were filed, two of which were from the 
appellants, and HealthTrio filed counterstatements in answer 
to that opposition on 9 March 2006. The opponents objected 
to those counterstatements, claiming they consisted of "bare 
denials", and did not fully explain the grounds upon which 
HealthTrio contested the opposition. The Intellectual Prop-
erty Office of New Zealand (IPONZ) required substitute 
counterstatements which HealthTrio filed, and at the same 
time filed a series of proposed amendments to the complete 
specification, which were claimed to be in the nature of 
explanation. The amendments were accepted by a patent 
examiner who considered them allowable, under s 40(1) of 
the Patents Act 1953, as being by way of "explanation/ 
correction". The appellants objected, contending that the 
amendments constituted broadening amendments and again 
submitted that the counterstatement was imprecise. A hear-
ing was held before the Assistant Commissioner to determine 
the status of the amendments and the adequacy of the respon-
dent's pleadings in its substitute counterstatements. On 21 
May 2007 the Assistant Commissioner upheld the respon-
dent's right to make the proposed amendments and held the 
substitute counterstatements to be sufficient. This was an 
appeal against the decision to allow the amendments. 
Sections 38 to 40 of the Patents Act 1953 provide for the 
amendment of specifications. Section 38 provides that a 
patentee, or an applicant for a patent at any time after 
acceptance of its complete specification, may apply to the 
Commissioner for leave to amend the complete specification. 
Subject to s 40, the Commissioner may allow the application, 
subject to such conditions, if any, he or she thinks fit. Any 
such application for leave to amend a specification is required 
to state the nature of the proposed amendments, to give full 
particulars of the reasons for which the application is made, 
and to be advertised in the prescribed manner (s 38(3) and 
(4)). Section 40 contains important restrictions on the extent 
to which an applicant may amend a specification. First, an 
amendment to a complete specification can only be made if 
that amendment disclaims, corrects or explains some aspect 
of the specification. Second, unless correcting an "obvious 
mistake", the Commissioner can not allow any such dis-
claimer, correction or explanation if its effect would be to 
broaden the scope of the specification. Section 38(6) pro-
vides that public advertisement is not required for amend-
ments made during the opposition process. The Judge said 
that the rationale for s 38(6) appeared to be that, where 
amendment of a specification was effected in proceedings in 
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opposition, it was sufficient that participants in the opposi-
tion proceedings were aware of, and if necessary could 
challenge, any such amendment. The issue as regarded s 38(6) 
was as to the meaning of the phrase "effected in proceedings 
in opposition". 
The Appeal 
The appellants appealed on two principal grounds. The first 
was that the ability to rely on s 38(6) of the Act and make 
amendments to a specification, pursuant to s 40 and free 
from the requirements of s 38, was limited to amendments 
made as a specific response to grounds of opposition, and 
that the amendments allowed by the Assistant Commissioner 
did not come within that category. In this the appellants 
relied on The Emulsol Corporation's Application.3 The sec-
ond ground was that, even if the respondent was entitled to 
proceed only under s 40, the amendments sought to be made 
did not meet the criteria set out in s 40(1) as they were not by 
way of disclaimer, correction or explanation. 
The respondent argued that Emulsol was not authority 
for the proposition argued for, that even if it was, the decision 
did not apply in New Zealand, that in any event the amend-
ments were made in response to issues raised in opposition, 
and that the amendments clearly came within the category of 
amendments allowed by s 40(1). 
The Judge said that, as an appeal under s 38(5) against a 
decision of the Assistant Commissioner to allow amend-
ments to a complete specification, s 97(3) provided that the 
Court had the same discretionary powers as conferred upon 
the Commissioner. This was an appeal from the exercise of a 
discretion, and it must therefore be established that the 
Assistant Commissioner proceeded on a wrong principle, 
gave undue weight to an irrelevant matter, insufficient weight 
to a relevant one, or was plainly wrong. If those grounds, 
individually or collectively, were established then it was for 
the Court to exercise its discretion in deciding the applica-
tion.4 The Court should, however, pay appropriate deference 
to the Assistant Commissioner, and IPONZ generally, as they 
possessed considerable specialist expertise. 
The Judge considered the Emulsol decision, and its rel-
evance. He found that there was more than a little uncer-
tainty as to the propositions Emulsol was authority for. 
However, Emulsol might be taken as acknowledgement and 
approval of a British Patent Office ("British Office") practice 
to require amendments made during opposition proceedings, 
but not made in response to a specific ground of opposition, 
to be advertised. The real issue was the relevance of that 
practice to New Zealand. The Judge said that that relevance 
was minimal at the time the practice was first formulated, but 
that the United Kingdom Patents Act 1949 did introduce a 
statutory provision (s 29) which was subsequently adopted 
in New Zealand as s 38 of the Patents Act 1953. The practice 
of the British Office continued despite the new legislation, 
which might be taken to suggest that the new legislation 
codified the previous, apparently extra-statutory, practice. It 
was arguable, given the history, that the New Zealand Act 
should be applied in a like manner, so that the requirement 
that an amendment be a response to a specific ground of 
opposition would be read into the s 38(6) phrase "effected in 
proceedings in opposition". However the Judge found that 
the legislative intention was not clear, and concluded that 
adoption in New Zealand of the United Kingdom provision 
need not be taken as legislative approval of the practice of the 
British Office in this area. The Judge said that it was open to 
Parliament to expressly include this practice of the British 
Office in s 38(6), but it appeared that Parliament chose not to do 
so. The Judge said that the wording of the provision was 
clear, and that without some persuasive basis, the simple 
phrase, "effected in proceedings in opposition", allowed for 
little other than a literal interpretation. The Judge was not 
persuaded that what appeared to be an extra-statutory prac-
tice of the British Office was intended to be read in to the 
legislation when introduced in New Zealand. The Judge was 
also unpersuaded that the phrase should be interpreted in a 
manner other than that which was apparent from the clear 
wording. In addition, the Judge said that the clear wording 
did not require that the amendments meet a specific ground 
of opposition. The relevance of the practice to New Zealand 
was therefore minimal at best, and the appellants' argument 
that any amendment "effected in opposition proceedings" 
must respond to a point of opposition, rather than being a 
matter which, subject to s 40, the applicant considers appro-
priate to make, was not contemplated by the legislation and 
was not a practice adopted by the Commissioner. 
The Judge also found that, should this conclusion be 
wrong, the amendments could nevertheless be regarded as 
having been made in specific response to a ground of oppo-
sition, specifically the ground that the complete specification 
did not sufficiently and fairly describe the invention or the 
method by which it was to be performed. That broad ground 
allowed the finding that the proposed amendments, being 
made as they were to explain or correct elements of the 
respondent's complete specification, were intended by the 
respondent to meet the opposition by ensuring the specifica-
tion sufficiently and fairly described the invention. 
The Judge did not consider that the Assistant Commis-
sioner had erred in concluding that each amendment fell 
within a category of disclaimer, correction, or explanation. 
The Assistant Commissioner carefully considered each pro-
posed amendment, and was mindful of all relevant legal 
principles. The appeal was dismissed. 
Lennox Hearth Products Inc v Burley Appli-
ances Ltd (High Court, Auckland, CIV 2001 
4044302020, 23 November 2007, Keane J) 
This was a case about the interpretation of a technology 
licensing agreement, and about liabilities for royalty pay-
ments under that agreement. 
Factual Background 
The plaintiff, Lennox Hearth Products, was a United States 
company which had acquired rights to gas heater technology 
invented and developed by a New Zealand man, John Flem-
ing ("Fleming"). The technology enabled the manufacture of 
gas heaters that did not require an exterior flue, because the 
3. 57 RPC 256. 
4.    Amadeus Global Travel Distribution SA v Sabre Inc (High Court, Wellington AP1 6/02, 14 March 2003, Ronald 
Young J). 
New Zealand Intellectual Property Journal May 2008 437 
IP ROUND-UP: RECENT DECISIONS FROM THE COURTS 
heaters consumed their fuel and toxic emissions completely. 
The defendant and licensee, Burley Appliances ("Burley"), 
was an English manufacturer and distributor of electric and 
gas heaters. 
Burley was initially licensed by Fleming's company to use 
the technology in October 1995. The rights were then assigned 
to the Queenstown Trust, which was also a vehicle for 
Fleming, and the Queenstown Trust granted Burley the license 
in issue to run from January 1997 to January 1999. The 
licence enabled Burley to manufacture and sell in Europe a 
range of gas heaters from New Zealand, some of which were 
then unique, and to manufacture such heaters in housings of 
its own design. The Queenstown Trust terminated the pri-
mary licence on 22 April 1999. The case concerned what 
royalties, if any, remained payable by Burley. Burley had paid 
the primary royalties owed under the license in relation to the 
manufacture and distribution of the New Zealand product 
range. The issue was the lesser royalties provided for in the 
agreement relating to the manufacture by Burley of heaters in 
housings of its own design, incorporating the three interre-
lated elements that enabled complete combustion, the burner, 
the catalyst and the control element. 
Clause 5.2 of the licence provided: 
In the event that the Licensee sells a product comprising a 
burner assembly, catalytic technology and control element in 
accordance with the products and housings and other 
portions of the appliance solely of the design for the 
licensee, the licensee shall pay to the licensor a royalty at 
the rate of 5% of the United Kingdom list price for the 
entire product less 34% less 20%. 
Burley therefore remained liable to pay the lesser royalty for 
any product it manufactured and sold that had at its core the 
technology that set the products licensed apart, "a burner 
assembly, catalytic technology and control element in accor-
dance with the products". Clause 1.1 provided that the 
products were: 
Gas heating appliances or parts thereof incorporating any 
and all aspects of the designs and/or inventions embodied 
in G2000, G4000, G9000 and G10,000 models of the 
licensor. 
Liability under cl 5.2 survived the licence ceasing in its 
primary sense as a result of cl 11.3 which provided on 
termination for: 
... an ongoing non-exclusive licence for products as defined 
in clause 5.2 in return for royalties and payment as 
provided for in clauses 5.2 and Section 6 of this Agreement. 
Issues 
The Judge said that the principal issue was to what extent the 
three interrelated elements licensed had to be "in accordance 
with the products". The first question was whether the 
licence encompassed any components that Burley used 
serving the same functions, or only the very or 
substantially similar components. The second related 
question was in what sense, if at all, did the elements 
licensed need to embody "designs and/or inventions". Did 
these last words confirm any more than that the parties 
then assumed that the three elements were novel or 
inventive, or did they incorporate into the licence as a 
further point of reference Fleming's patents then existing 
or claimed? Also did they mean that the three elements were 
only capable of licence if they were inventive or novel? The 
Judge said that however these issues were answered, the 
products licensed must be compared with those Burley now 
manufactured independently of the licence and as of right. 
The Judge said that there was no issue that the licence was 
of technology not of any patent (although aspects of the 
technology were the subject of patent protection). The 
Judge said that, like any agreement commercial in character, 
it was to be construed objectively, as the parties would then 
have understood it, against the context in which it was 
entered.5 To the extent that the licence incorporated any 
concept or term deriving from related patents or claims, the 
words used still carried their objective meaning; a meaning 
that may be fixed with the help of a skilled reader.6 
The Judge said that Burley's liability, if any, sprang only 
from the agreement and turned on its evident 
idiosyncrasies. The Judge referred to AB Consolidated Ltd v 
Europe Strength Food Co Pty Ltd 7 as authority that a 
licence might be of known technology in a new 
interrelation. The Judge said that the agreement did not 
incorporate Fleming's patents and registered designs either 
expressly or as an implicit point of reference. Their place 
in the analysis was, at most, contextual. 
Arguments 
The plaintiff argued firstly that what was licensed was 
a novel process for the complete combustion of gas and 
toxic emissions, then embodied in the three interrelated 
elements in the products primarily licensed: the burner 
assembly, the catalytic technology and the control element. 
The licence embraced any use by Burley of the three 
element concept deriving from the licensed products. 
Secondly, the plaintiff argued that though what was 
licensed was a concept embodied in the products primarily 
licensed, described abstractly as "designs and/or 
inventions" that did not mean that each element had to be 
novel or inventive and worthy of patent or registration as a 
design. Only some of the components were novel or 
inventive. What was novel or inventive was their relation 
one to another and that was what Burley wished to have the 
right to use, a right that it continued to exercise and for 
which it remained liable. 
Burley argued that the licence was of particular technol-
ogy, the three elements in the products primarily licensed, in 
5. Citing Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 All ER 98 at 114-5; Boat Park 
Ltd v Hutchinson (1999) 2 NZLR 74; Pyne Gould Guinness Ltd v Montgomery Watson (NZ) Ltd [2001] NZAR 789; 
and Cambridge Antibody Technology v Abbott Biotechnology Ltd 6. Abbott GmbH a- Co KG [2004] EWHC 2974 
(Pat). 
6. Peterson Portable Sawing Systems Ltd (in liq) & Peterson v Lucas & G W Lucas & Sons Pty Ltd [2006] NZSC 20; 
Catnic Components Ltd v Hill & Smith Ltd [1982] RPC 183 at 243; and Kirin-Amgen Inc v Hoescht Marion Roussel 
Ltd [2004] UKHL 46 at para 78. 
7. [1978] 2 NZLR 515 (CA) at 522. 
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their fixed relation, each incorporating their distinguishing 
"designs and/or inventions". The process, to which three 
such elements serving their respective functions were generic, 
was not the subject of the licence. Burley said it could only be 
liable if the three critical components in its heaters were 
either identical to, or practically indistinguishable from, those 
in the licensed products. Secondly, Burley argued that each of 
the components had to be novel or inventive, and that, 
although the licence may not have been of Fleming's then 
existing or claimed patents or registered designs, it did incor-
porate them to define what was licensed. Burley argued that 
this had two consequences, first, that it could only be liable if 
the critical components in its heaters were identical to, or 
practically indistinguishable from, not just those in the licensed 
products, but their equivalents in the process for complete 
combustion claimed and depicted in Fleming's United King-
dom patent, and second, that what was licensed was, in 
essence, Fleming's "designs and/or inventions" embodied in 
the components in the licensed products. To the extent that 
those components were neither novel nor inventive, they 
were incapable of licence, and Burley here identified relevant 
prior art. 
Decision 
The Judge concluded that there was a single threshold for 
Burley's liability and that was not, as the plaintiff contended, 
whether the critical technology in Burley's products embod-
ied the process for complete combustion, to which generi-
cally the three elements were integral. Neither did it depend, 
as Burley contended, on whether each was individually inven-
tive or novel nor on Fleming's patents. The Judge said that 
Burley's liability depended on whether the three components 
in the Burley products were to the same design, or a design 
deriving from, those in the products licensed. 
The Judge said that this was a licence of products and 
parts, which happened also to enjoy some patent protection. 
The Judge referred to cl 1.2 of the license agreement which 
defined Fleming's intellectual property rights: 
All inventions (subject to letters patent, pending applica-
tions or otherwise), designs (whether or not subject to a 
design application or registered design) or any copyright 
vesting in any works relating to the G2000, G4000, 
G9000 and G10,000 models of the licensor. 
Clause 1.3 defined proprietary data: 
All inventions, designs, methods, techniques, formulae, 
specifications, copyright subsisting and (sic), published or 
unpublished material in the nature of plans, drawings, 
sketches, photographs, models, three-dimensional repro-
ductions of the products or the like, data and information 
which are, or at any time after the date of the agreement 
come to be, owned by the licensor and which relates to the 
products or their design, manufacture, installation, com-
missioning or operation. 
Fleming's intellectual property rights were recognised in recip-
rocal warranties given in the agreement, and there were 
provisions imposing a duty on the licensor to pursue patent 
protection and imposing duties to notify of any threats to 
intellectual property rights. However the Judge found that 
the definition of proprietary data served no identifiable func-
tion in the agreement. 
The Judge said that this was a licence of technology. It did 
not licence Burley to manufacture to its own design gas 
heating appliances embodying an inventive concept pro- 
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tected, or capable of being protected by patent. It licensed 
Burley to manufacture specified models, or heaters with 
derivative elements, to which the patents and any proprietary 
data related. The Judge said that Fleming's intellectual prop-
erty rights may have underpinned the products licensed but 
those rights were not critical. They were neither the subject of 
the licence, nor incorporated expressly or necessarily implic-
itly to define what was licensed. To the extent that the 
plaintiff's claim to the residual royalty now rested on any 
allied claim to proprietary data given to Burley and never 
returned, that had no support in the agreement. 
The Judge held that Burley's liability under cl 5.2 had to be 
assessed by comparing the critical elements in the Burley 
models, for which the lesser royalty was claimed, against the 
products then or last licensed, which happened still to be 
those specified in cl 1.1. Burley's products would be "in 
accordance with the products" only if they were identical or 
plainly derivative. The Judge compared the critical elements, 
and held that the Burley products were neither identical to 
the licensed products, nor substantially similar. In those 
critical respects the Burley products did not derive from the 
licensed products except to the extent that they used the same 
or similar proprietary components, and that was inevitable 
and of no moment. The Burley products were, in all the 
respects that counted, truly distinct, and they did not attract 
the royalty in cl 5.2. Burley was therefore under no liability 
to pay to the plaintiffs the secondary royalty claimed. 
Comment 
This case centred on the interpretation of a licensing 
agreement. The Judge took the approach that this was a 
licence of technology not of any intellectual property right, 
saying that intellectual property rights may have 
underpinned the products licensed but those rights were 
not critical. They were neither the subject of the licence, nor 
incorporated expressly or necessarily implicitly to define 
what was licensed. This distinction between the technology 
and the intellectual property rights in the technology is 
potentially confusing in the context of a licensing 
agreement, as it leaves open the question as to exactly what 
property or rights are the subject matter of the licence. 
Indeed, if the licence is not a licence of intellectual property 
rights, or of confidential information, there is scope for 
uncertainty as to the necessity or rationale for the licence 
agreement and the payment of royalties. 
Inverness Medical Switzerland GmbH v MDS 
Diagnostics Ltd (High Court, Auckland CIV 
2007-404-00748, 21 December 2007, Potter J) 
This is an ongoing copyright infringement case about draw-
ings relating to pregnancy testing devices. The plaintiff, 
Inverness Medical Switzerland GmbH, alleges that the defen-
dants, MDS Diagnostics Ltd, imported into New Zealand 
devices that were copied, or substantially copied, from the 
plaintiff's copyright works when it knew or ought to have 
known of the existence of the plaintiff's copyright. 
This judgment concerned two interlocutory applications. 
The plaintiff had applied for particular and further and 
better discovery, and confidentiality orders in respect of some 
documents. The defendant had applied for further and better 
discovery and setting aside the plaintiff's claim to confiden-
tiality in respect of certain documents. 
The Judge considered the applications in turn. The Judge 
granted the plaintiff's application for further and better 
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discovery, and declined, (except to an extent stated), the 
defendant's application for further and better discovery. The 
Judge made determinations pursuant to r 307 in relation to 
specific documents. The defendant's challenge to the plain-
tiff's claim to confidentiality was, except to an extent stated, 
dismissed. 
Sintes v W H Harris Ltd (High Court, 
Christchurch CIV 2006-409.001402, 27 Febru-
ary 2008, Fogarty J) 
This was a patent infringement action, and the defendant, W 
H Harris Ltd, counterclaimed seeking to revoke the patent. 
The plaintiff, Paul Sintes, had designed a wood-burning 
stove that allowed wood to combust more completely than 
earlier stoves. His stove complied with the strict regulatory 
standards for air quality imposed by Environment Canterbury. 
The plaintiff lodged a patent application for his stove in April 
2002, and the patent was subsequently granted. 
The defendant was a manufacturer of wood fuelled stoves, 
and in February 2004 it began selling a new stove, the 
DVI-165. The plaintiff claimed that the DVI-165 infringed 
his patent. The defendant counterclaimed claiming that Claims 1 
and 10 were invalid and seeking an order revoking the 
patent. 
Novelty 
The defendant contended that Claims 1 and 10 were not new, 
and were known and used before the priority date, referring 
to s 41(1)(e) of the Patents Act 1953. They argued that the 
essential integers were disclosed in three prior publications, 
and that the invention was used in New Zealand before the 
priority date in four specified ways. The Judge first consid-
ered the prior publications, and said that counsel agreed that 
each publication was to be taken separately, and that the test 
was whether the prior publication contained a clear descrip-
tion of, or clear instructions to do or make, something that 
would infringe a claim in the patent if carried out after the 
granting of the patents The Judge considered each of the 
prior publications, and concluded that no prior publication 
disclosed all of the integers of the claimed invention, so that 
the s 41(1)(e) claim that the invention lacked novelty did not 
succeed. 
Obviousness 
The defendants also argued that the invention was obvious 
and did not involve an inventive step, in terms of s 41(1)(f) of 
the Patents Act 1953. The Judge said that the test for obvi-
ousness was that set out in Ancare New Zealand Ltd v 
Cyanamid NZ Ltd,'' which was approved by the Supreme 
Court in Lucasv Peterson Portable Sawing Systems Ltd: 
…the test is well-established. It postulates a person 
(or, where appropriate, a team) skilled in the field but not 
inventive, invested with the common general knowledge 
available in the field at the priority date, presented with 
the prior knowledge or prior use relied upon. Prior docu-
ments may be looked at together if that is what the skilled 
person or team would do. It asks whether to that person 
or team the alleged inventive step would be obvious and 
would be recognized, without bringing to bear any inven-
tiveness, as something that could be done or is at least 
worth trying. That is a question of fact. If any embodi-
ment within the scope of the claim is obvious the claim is 
invalid ... 10 
The Judge reviewed the evidence, and particularly the evi-
dence of expert witnesses, as to obviousness. The Judge 
concluded that the claimed invention consisted of a 
combination of known elements, and said that such 
inventions posed problems when addressing whether or 
not they were obvious. The Judge referred to the Supreme 
Court decision in Lucas v Peterson, and said that two 
inventions do not become one invention because they 
were included in the same hardware. However, if the two 
interact on each other so that there is a synergy between 
them they may constitute a single invention having a 
combined effect, and the statutory test of obviousness was 
then applied to the idea of combining integers. The 
difficulty in this case was that all of the elements of the 
stove interacted in a synergistic fashion, but it was also 
argued that these reactions were predictable, and also 
that a process of experimentation was involved. The 
Judge also said that it was appropriate to consider 
the motivation of a person skilled in the art to use the 
knowledge available to build a better stove. 
The Judge found that aspects of the invention were the 
result of trial and error and not predictable. The Judge said 
that policy required him to be cautious in the case of 
combination patents. The Judge found that what the 
plaintiff did was use knowledge general in the art and of 
prior use in the Kent Log Fire when placing the exhaust 
duct adjacent to the front of the firebox. He was also using 
knowledge general in the art when combining all elements 
of the firebox together with the element known since 
August 2002, the use of the double vent flue. The Judge 
said that what he did was not predictable, and it could not 
be said confidently that it was obvious, but it did not 
require a degree of invention, it was the result of trial and 
error. Without the policy of caution the Judge might have 
found it was obvious. However, the Judge also found that 
an additional integer, the air intake via the flue, was 
disclosed in a newspaper article in August 2001, with 
the result that Claim 1 and Claim 10 were obvious. 
Leave was reserved for counsel to agree or file submissions 
as to whether it followed that the whole of the patent 
should be declared invalid as a result. 
Infringement 
The Judge went on to consider infringement. The plaintiff 
argued that the DVI-165 infringed every integer of Claim 
1 and 10 of the Sintes patent. However, after consideration, 
the Judge concluded that the DVI-16S did not infringe 
Claim 1 because it did not have an exhaust duct at the top 
of the firebox adjacent to the front of the firebox, and it 
did not infringe Claim 10 principally because its firebox 
was not fitted with heat dissipating fins. 
8. Citing Lucas v Peterson Portable Sawing Systems Ltd [2006] 3 NZLR 721 at 724. 
9. [2000] 3 NZLR 299 at 309, upheld on appeal to the Privy Council at Ancare New Zealand Ltd v Fort Dodge New 
Zealand Ltd [2002] UKPC 8. 
10. [2006] 3 NZLR 721 at 724. 
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Outcomes 
The action for infringement failed. The counterclaim suc-
ceeded as Claims 1 and 10 were found to be obvious, but the 
application for a declaration of invalidity was reserved. 
Steelbro NZ Ltd v Tidd Ross Todd Ltd (Court of 
Appeal, CA7/06, [2007] NZCA 486, 2 November 
2007, Hammond, Arnold and Wilson JJ) 
This was an unsuccessful appeal by Steelbro against a finding 
of Chisholm J in the High Court that Steelbro had infringed 
Tidd Ross Todd (TRT)'s copyright in the drawings of a 
sideloading trailer called the TRT Triple. 
Facts 
Sideloading trailers (or sidelifters) were used to self load and 
unload shipping containers using hydraulic cranes fixed to 
the chassis of the trailer. TRT had developed its TRT triple 
trailer which used a third folding crane in the middle of the 
trailer and could handle two 20 foot containers separately. 
TRT was successful in marketing and selling its TRT triple. 
In September 2000 the managing directors of TRT and 
Steelbro entered into discussions about the possibility of 
Steelbro selling TRT triples in New Zealand and overseas. 
During the course of these discussions TRT supplied Steelbro 
with specifications, a drawing and a brochure relating to the 
TRT triple. No agreement was reached, and discussions were 
abandoned late in 2000. 
Steelbro went on to produce its own triple crane sidelifter. It 
developed specifications and then used a "geometry optimisa-
tion" computer program to design its unit, ultimately pro-
ducing its own sideloader in late 2003. Steelbro maintained 
that its sideloader reflected its independent design, testing 
and manufacturing process and did not involve copying the 
TRT unit in whole or in part, even though it accepted that it 
had measured a TRT unit. 
TRT sued for infringement of copyright, claiming that the 
Steelbro unit was an altered copy of the TRT triple, which 
took its essence and infringed copyright in its drawings. It 
alleged that the shape and configuration of the individual 
components of the centre crane and stabiliser, the centre 
crane/stabiliser assembly and the v-shaped chassis arrange-
ment had been taken, and that the parts taken constituted a 
substantial part of the copyright work. 
High Court Decision 
In the High Court, the Judge concluded that copyright infringe-
ment had been established. He found that striking similarity 
between the shape and configuration of, and inter -
relationship between, the centre crane, base, stabiliser and 
chassis of the two units. He said that the complex functional 
inter-relationship between those components went well beyond 
the idea or concept of incorporating a central folding crane 
into a sideloader so that it could transport two empty 20 foot 
containers as well as an empty 40 foot container. The idea 
was one thing, but it was quite another thing to convert the 
idea into a functional product with the requisite folding and 
lifting capabilities. He did not accept the view that to the 
extent that the similarities went beyond the overall concept 
they were the natural consequence of design constraints. 
Amongst other things, the evidence indicated that the incor-
poration of the centre crane into a v-shaped recess in the 
chassis was not the only way that the objective of a third flat 
 
folding crane could have been achieved. He also noted that 
there was some flexibility in terms of overall length and 
height, and that an in line stabiliser was not necessarily the 
only option. He found that the similarities could not be 
explained away on the basis of constraints. In relation to 
differences, the Judge held that, while there were differences, 
in the overall context of the case they did not justify a finding 
of independent design. They arose more from modifying a 
TRT design rather than from an independent design process. 
The Judge also found that the parts taken from the plaintiff's 
work represented a substantial part. Causal connection was 
established as the defendant had repeated access to the 
plaintiff's product. The defendant used the TRT triple design 
as its springboard and thereby appropriated TRT's time, skill 
and judgment, even though it contributed its own skill and 
judgment in refining some features and components. 
Arguments on Appeal 
On appeal, Steelbro submitted that Chisholm J erred in 
finding infringement of copyright and that the Steelbro unit 
did not reproduce the TRT Triple or a substantial part of it 
and there was no causal connection. Steelbro also argued 
that the Judge's decision was inimical to the doctrines of 
competition and progress which were important policy con-
siderations in copyright law. Steelbro submitted that the 
Judge made errors of principle and errors of primary fact. 
The Judge's alleged errors of principle were: 
1. Finding that a substantial part of the work was copied 
because of a failure to properly distinguish between 
"concept" and "expression of design". 
2. Finding that there was an objective resemblance between 
the two designs because: 
 he did not properly analyse the similarities relied 
upon by TRT, and failed to adequately address the 
appellant's explanations for similarities, in particu-
lar the design, engineering and regulatory restraints; 
and 
 he focussed on the concepts and preliminary sketches 
rather than the working drawings and concepts. 
3. Finding that there was a causal connection between the 
TRT Triple and the Steelbro unit because he relied on 
the idea of a "springboard", which had no place in 
copyright law. 
Steelbro also argued that the Judge made five identified 
errors of primary fact. 
Steelbro submitted that the Judge's first error of principle 
was in finding copying of a substantial part, because the 
Judge failed to distinguish between an "idea" or "concept" on 
one hand, and an "expression of design" on the other. 
Steelbro argued that the idea was the concept of a flat folding 
crane fitting within a drop frame chassis, and took issue with 
Chisholm J's finding that, when viewed collectively, the indi-
vidual components of the TRT Triple central section (crane/ 
base/stabilisers/chassis) that had been taken represented a 
substantial part of the plaintiff's work. Steelbro submitted 
that these were features of the concept, and not the copy-
righted expression, and that the Judge failed to distinguish 
between the unprotected concept and the protected expres-
sion of design. Steelbro argued that the Judge focused on the 
similar concepts and overlooked significant differences between 
the Steelbro and TRT units, and that the effect of the judg-
ment was to ban any competitor from producing a sidelifter 
with a flat folding centre crane which stowed below deck. 
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TRT argued that Chisholm J clearly reminded himself of 
the need to distinguish between idea and expression, and that 
it was not appropriate for an appellate Court to supplant its 
own view in circumstances where the trial Judge clearly 
turned his mind to the issue and reached a reasoned decision 
based on the evidence available to him at the conclusion of an 
eight day trial. TRT submitted that the idea was having a 
third crane and stabiliser, and the expression of design was 
the particular shape and configuration of the TRT Triple's 
third crane and stabiliser assembly and the associated design 
of the chassis to incorporate those components. TRT argued 
that, even if the sideliner with a flat folding crane was merely 
an idea, Steelbro's expression of design was unaccountably 
similar to the TRT design, and that Steelbro's failure to 
explore alternatives, coupled with the fact that it had access 
to the TRT Triple during the design process, lead to an 
inference of copying that Steelbro had failed to rebut. 
Steelbro argued that the Judge made a second error of 
principle in finding objective similarity between the Steelbro 
unit and the TRT Triple because he failed to properly analyse 
the similarities, and overlooked the importance of the differ-
ences, and he focussed on the geometry optimisations and the 
Appendix B sketches, rather than the working drawings. 
Steelbro submitted that the Judge gave no, or insufficient, 
weight to a range of factors which dictated that there would 
he a resemblance between the two sidelifters, and that he did 
not undertake a careful analysis of the similarities alleged by 
TRT, and if he had done so he would have recognised that 
they were confined to the overall concept, not the expression 
of design, were the result of external constraints, or were 
commonly used by other manufacturers. Steelbro also sub-
mitted that the Judge failed to consider the similarities in the 
context of the differences, and wrongly concluded the differ-
ences arose from modifying the TRT design, rather than as 
the result of an independent design process, and particular 
differences were identified. 
TRT said that the Steelbro unit was an "altered copy", 
that it was not an identical reproduction of the copyright 
works, but took their essence, and that the effort to subse-
quently modify the work was irrelevant.11 TRT argued that 
the importance of similarities was that they showed whether 
something had been copied, and differences were only rel-
evant to determine whether sufficient changes had been 
made to avoid infringement. The ultimate test was whether 
the appellant appropriated part of the time, labour, skill and 
judgment contributed by TRT in creating the copyright 
works. TRT submitted that the Judge turned his mind to the 
question of differences and similarities, reminded him as to 
the need for caution in cases involving industrial design, and 
undertook a meticulous analysis of the evidence. 
Steelbro also submitted that the Judge failed to focus on 
the plaintiff's drawings, and that this omission may have 
been instrumental in leading the Judge into the error of 
focussing unduly on the geometry optimisation process and 
the Appendix B sketches. TRT argued that the Judge did base 
his findings on a comparison between the copyright works 
and the alleged infringing product via the comparison made 
by the expert witnesses, and that this was a legitimate approach. 
Steelbro submitted that the Judge made a third error of 
principle in relation to causal connection, Steelbro said 
that the Judge formulated an alternative "springboard" test 
unsupported by authority or principle, and that the key 
factors identified by the Judge in support of his conclusion 
were illusory. Steelbro submitted that the fact that a 
defendant had inspected a plaintiff's product, and even 
used it as a point of reference, did not of itself justify the 
finding of copying. Steelbro argued that causation was not 
established and that a substantial part had not been taken. 
TRT submitted that the Judge was correct to draw an 
inference of copying from inspection of the TRT Triple, 
and that the authorities showed that similarity, combined 
with proof of access to the copyright works, leads to a 
rebuttable inference of copying and that Steelbro's 
evidence did not rebut the inference. 
Steelbro also submitted, and TRT disputed, that the Judge 
had made a number of errors of primary fact, and the 
Court of Appeal reviewed these. 
Steelbro also made policy arguments. Steelbro argued 
that, particularly in the area of industrial design, a certain 
degree of copying and comparison was inevitable and 
desirable in a competitive market, and innovation based on 
prior design should not be unduly constrained. TRT 
submitted that New Zealand's treatment of industrial 
designs was at odds with some major trading partners, and 
should therefore be seen as deliberate. If a change was to be 
made, it should be implemented by the legislature, not the 
courts. TRT also said that it was necessary to draw a line 
between copying leading to unfair competition, and 
innovation leading to technological progress, and that 
Steelbro's conduct fell on the impermissible side of that 
line. 
Court of Appeal Decision 
On the policy questions, the Court of Appeal said that if 
on the facts Steelbro substantially copied the design of 
TRT, there were no valid policy reasons for upholding that 
conduct, and conversely, if Steelbro's design represented 
an innovative development drawing upon but further 
developing existing technology, it should be welcomed and 
encouraged. The Court said that there was a difficult issue 
in New Zealand as to whether the so-called 
copyright/design overlap, which allowed potential 
copyright protection in this sort of area, was appropriate. 
However there was no doubt as to the present state of the 
law, and it was not argued that the Court should 
endeavour to deal with this issue judicially, by somehow 
recasting the appropriate boundaries of copyright and 
design law. 
The Court said that it came down to a question of fact as 
to whether Chisholm J was correct in finding that Steelbro 
had illegitimately crossed the line into copying not only the 
concept of TRT but also the expression of that concept. 
Steelbro had the burden of persuading the Court that the 
trial Judge was wrong, and this was particularly difficult as 
the Judge had made findings of credibility adverse to 
Steelbro. The Court of Appeal referred to Designers 
Guild
12
 as authority that a finding of copying was for the 
trial judge and that finding should only be reversed where 
the Judge had erred in principle. 
11. See Bleirnan v News Media (Auckland) Ltd [199412 NZLR 673 (CA) at 679; and Designers Guild v Russell Williams 
(Textiles) Ltd [2.0011 1 All ER 700 (HL) at 714. 
12. Designers Guild Ltd v Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd [2001] 1 All ER 700. 
442 New Zealand Intellectual Property Journal   May 2008 
IP ROUND-UP: RECENT DECISIONS FROM THE COURTS 
The Court said that in considering whether expression 
rather than just ideas had been taken, and in whether there 
had been copying of a substantial part, the factors the Court 
would commonly have regard to included the "starting point" 
of the defendant's work; the extent of the defendant's alter-
ation (that is, whether a substantial part of the plaintiff's 
work survived in the defendant's so as to appear to be a copy 
of the original work); and generally the way in which the 
defendant had taken advantage of the plaintiff's work. Whether 
there had been a substantial copying was thus "a major tool 
for giving expression to the Courts' sense of fair play"13 or, 
"where the courts find that a work B is not an infringement 
of the copyright in a work A because it is 'original' what they 
really mean is that B owes so little to A that it ought not to 
count as piracy".14 
The Court said that Steelbro had cast its net wide in 
attempting to establish one or more material errors of fact in 
the judgment under appeal, and had approached, if not 
reached, the position of coming to an appellate Court in the 
hope that the impression of at least two members of the court 
would differ from that of the trial judge. Steelbro had not 
persuaded even one member of the Court that Chisholm J 
was in error, but to the contrary, the Court was impressed by 
the careful way in which he analysed the complex factual 
background and came to well-reasoned conclusions on all 
the issues which arose. Steelbro had started with TRT's 
product distinctly in mind, and then endeavoured to replicate 
the TRT model, in the sense of building a better model of that 
kind. From time to time Steelbro "checked back" against 
what TRT had done. In fairness, there was no question 
Steelbro did a great deal of work itself, but an inference of 
copying was possible, indeed probable, unless Steelbro could 
negative it by establishing that the similarity was not due to 
the copying. The Judge had not erred in principle in his 
approach, and it was open to Chisholm J to find that Steelbro 
had "copied" the TRT product in the relevant legal sense. 
The appeal was dismissed. 
13. Cornish and Llewellyn, Intellectual Property (Sed 2003) at [11-06]. 
14. Laddie, Prescott and Vittoria, The Modern Law of Copyright (3ed 2000) at 135. 
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